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ABSTRACT Over the last decade, rural township governments have been
subjected to intensive streamlining and rationalization programmes. This
article examines which ongoing reforms and processes are causing township
governments to become “hollow shells,” and explores the effects of “hollow-
ing out” on township government leaders, staff and rural residents. While
the aim of local government reform was to transform extractive township
governments into “service-oriented” agencies, this article finds that the cur-
rent logic of rural governance has produced township governments which
are squeezed from above and below. From above, township leaders face
the political imperatives of inspections, annual assessments, the need to
attract industrial investment and an ongoing process of “soft centralization”
by higher levels of government. From below, township staff are drawn out to
the villages to enforce family planning policies and maintain social stability.
Unprecedented numbers are working as “sent-down cadres” in villages
where their capacity to deliver services has been weakened by village amal-
gamations and the lifting of agricultural taxes and fees. Despite significant
boosts to rural health and education investment, rural residents still face a
level of government that regards them as problems to be dealt with, rather
than citizens to be served.
Increasing attention has been paid to the phenomenon of rural township govern-
ments being “hollowed out” in the wake of rural taxation reforms,1 but there is a
lack of detailed ethnographic information on the effects of this phenomenon.
This article is a detailed study of the lowest formal level of the Chinese state at
the township level. Its starting point is the perspective of township government
officials and ordinary staff themselves. I explore how township governments
have become hollow administrative shells and the specific processes which are
the basis for this “hollowing out,” and examine the implications for local
* Australian National University. Email: graeme.smith@anu.edu.au
1 See esp. John James Kennedy, “From the tax-for-fee reform to the abolition of agricultural taxes: the
impact on township governments in north-west China,” The China Quarterly, No. 189 (2007), pp. 43–
59; and Linda Chelan Li, “Working for the peasants? Strategic interactions and unintended conse-
quences in China’s rural tax reform,” The China Journal, No. 57 (2007), pp. 90–106.
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government in rural China. Nearly all studies in the Western literature have
tended to focus on either county or village governments with few examining
the inner workings of township governments, thus leaving the lowest level of
formal administration as something of a lacuna in China studies. In this article,
taking a county in central China’s rural heartland as my case study, I examine
how the local state functions at the township level, using surveys and extensive
interviews with county officials, township government workers, village cadres
and ordinary rural residents.
Previous authors have accurately described township governments as hollow
“administrative shells,” unable to provide basic services in the wake of tax-for-fee
reform during the 1990s and the abolition of agricultural taxes in 2006. However,
the mechanisms of hollowing out have not been fully elucidated. This article
argues that it is not just a consequence of the tax-for-fee reforms, but rather is
constantly reinforced by the revenue-raising and political imperatives faced by
township leaders, exacerbated by recent administrative reforms.
The first section details pressures from the county level in the form of higher-
level inspections, the pressure to attract investment and the “soft centralization”2
of township agencies. These pressures are hollowing township governments from
above by drawing township leaders and the most talented staff away from their
bailiwicks, thus transforming township governments into service agencies for
county leaders. The second section describes hollowing from below. In the
past, township governments guided village work, but with village governments
starved of revenue following the abolition of agricultural taxes in 2006 and the
ranks of village cadres depleted by village amalgamations, township government
workers are now undertaking tasks that were formerly shouldered by villages.
Unprecedented numbers of township staff are working as “sent-down” village
cadres to enforce the key political imperatives of family planning and social stab-
ility. I draw conclusions on how this hollowing process changes the nature of the
local state, and how this affects attempts to transform township governments into
service-oriented agencies.
This article is a result of extensive fieldwork conducted in 16 townships in a
relatively well-off county in Anhui province, referred to as Benghai.3 Anhui
was chosen because it was the pioneer in both tax-for-fee reforms during the
1990s. The county boasts a range of agricultural products in keeping with its var-
ied geography. Its GDP per capita in 2010 was slightly higher than the provincial
average because of the presence of many successful rural industries. When
agricultural taxes were abolished in 2006 the impact on government revenue
was negligible, as agricultural taxes had accounted for less than 10 per cent of
the county’s taxes.
2 Andrew Mertha, “China’s ‘soft’ centralization: shifting tiao/kuai authority relations,” The China
Quarterly, No. 184 (2005), pp. 791–810.
3 Due to the need to protect sources, Benghai is a pseudonym.
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From 2004 to 2008, I spent 21 months in Benghai county, working within
the county government on poverty alleviation projects related to agriculture,
education and forestry. As a result, I worked closely with township and county
government officials on a daily basis, allowing me to obtain information beyond
the scope of formal interviews. Surveys of 286 farm households in five different
townships were conducted with research teams in 2004, 2005 and 2008 to obtain
background information on rural residents’ experiences of taxation, land use,
village amalgamations and interaction with local cadres.
A survey of 95 township government staff in all 16 townships was conducted
with the assistance of the Ministry of Agriculture between January and March
2006. Extensive follow-up interviews with township staff and ordinary farmers
also took place. Interviews were conducted either at my residence in the county
seat or at the residences of interviewees. These provided a more nuanced picture
of their behaviour, allowed them to frame and discuss issues in their own terms
and to construct their own narratives of experiences with the local government.
Interviews were also conducted with academics, officials and businesspeople in
the prefectural capital, as well as Hefei, Beijing and Sichuan.
In addition to this ethnography, I draw upon the work of three Chinese
researchers who examine the day-to-day workings of township governments.
Zhao Shukai 赵树凯, from the State Council’s Development Research
Centre, surveyed 20 township governments in ten different provinces, spending
a considerable time in each township and inviting all the township Party sec-
retaries to Beijing for in-depth discussions.4 Gu Wenfeng谷文峰, a sociologist,
was posted by the Henan provincial government to a township in Hebi
prefecture, and detailed his experiences during two years as a township Party
secretary.5 The renowned political sociologist from the “Central China
School” of rural studies, Wu Yi 吴毅, spent a year with the cadres of a town-
ship in central China.6
Hollowed from Above
In this section, I argue that township governments in central China have been
hollowed out from above by three imperatives: the need to attract investment
to compensate for lost revenue and meet the political imperatives set by county
and provincial governments; the need to receive inspection teams from higher
levels of government; and “soft centralization” of township bureaus, which are
placed under county or provincial government control.
4 Zhao Shukai, “Rural governance in the midst of underfunding, deception, and mistrust,” in Andrew
Kipnis and Graeme Smith (eds.), Chinese Sociology & Anthropology, No. 39 (2007).
5 Gu Wenfeng, Feichang zishu: yi ge xiangzhen shuji de meng yu teng (Extraordinary Accounts: the Hopes
and Troubles of a Township Party Secretary) (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 2006).
6 Wu Yi, Xiao zhen xuanxiao: yi ge xiangzhen zhengzhi yunzuo de yanyi yu chanshi (Uproar in a Small
Town: Interpretation of a Township’s Political Operation) (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2007).
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Attracting investment
What functions does the township government serve, and how do ordinary town-
ship government staff perceive the priorities of the local state? To address these
questions, I asked township staff what, to them, were the main tasks of the town-
ship government, compared to 1999, the height of the Jiang era, and the 1980s.
The figure represents the percentage of staff who saw the task as a major (in the
top five of ten tasks) priority of the township government during the specified
time period. Items which score more than 50 per cent in this category are
major priorities and are highlighted in bold in Table 1.
Table 1 suggests that national Party policies (panel b) now have more influence
on Benghai’s township governments than during the Jiang Zemin era, when the
pressure from higher levels of government to collect taxes (panel j) was para-
mount.7 However, the third-ranked item in 2006, attracting investment (panel
g), is a priority of provincial and sub-provincial Party leaders, and has repeatedly
been criticized by national Party leaders.
Even the most impoverished townships are devoting resources and staff
towards attracting investment. In one remote township, 16 of the 55 formally
employed staff were members of the investment working group, including staff
from 13 different bureaus, as well as the township Party secretary, the township
head and a deputy Party secretary.8 Wealthier townships produce glossy invest-
ment guide books which describe projects that are seeking investment, and detail
the tax and land incentives available to prospective investors. Typically, a tax-free
period of three years is offered, as well as low land rental rates (as little as one
yuan per square metre, or even free for a certain period). Most townships had
set up agencies specifically to solicit investment, but ultimate responsibility lay
with the township head and the Party secretary.
Chinese scholars have questioned the value of each province, prefecture,
county, township and even village competing to offer the most attractive package
to investors.9 Setting quotas for attracting investment encourages township offi-
cials to falsify reports and force local businesses to register as “outside” or, better
yet, “foreign” investors.10 Funds that could be used to provide services for rural
residents are instead spent on entertaining prospective investors. This situation is
7 For an account of how township governments adapted to higher-level pressure to collect taxes during
the reform period, see Tian Yi and Zhao Xu, Ta xiang zhi shui (Township Taxes) (Beijing: Zhongxin
chubanshe, 2008).
8 It is near impossible to know how many staff are on the payroll of a township government. Gu estimated
that 69 cadres were on his official payroll, but 124 drew a salary (or 150 if laid-off and retired staff were
included): Gu Wenfeng, Extraordinary Accounts, p. 145.
9 See esp. Zhao Shukai, “Rural governance,” pp. 68–73; Wu Licai and Zhu Hongxuan, “Xiangzhen
gaige: xiangzhen ganbu de suo si suo xiang – dui Hubei sheng xiangzhen ganbu de wenjuan diaocha”
(“Township reform: what township cadres think – a survey of Hubei province”), Zhongguo nongcun
jingji (China Rural Economy), No. 11 (2005), p. 64.
10 Contrast this with Kellee Tsai’s description of Chinese businesses registering as foreign-invested enter-
prises to enhance their status and thus reduce interference from local government. Kellee S. Tsai,
Capitalism without Democracy (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 2007), pp. 183–88. In Benghai, local
cadres pressure businesses to register outside the county to enhance their personal political prospects.
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unlikely to change, unless the revenue incentives and assessment criteria faced by
provincial and sub-provincial authorities are altered.11 Many ordinary township
staff wondered about the practicability of the policy. In the words of a township
cadre who ran his own agricultural supplies business on the side:
What sorts of companies can we attract to a township like ours? We’re an hour’s drive from the
county seat. Get serious. Profitable businesses will look for somewhere close to the big markets,
with good transport and communications, somewhere like Hangzhou or Shanghai. So we land
the industries no one else wants, big polluters, unprofitable industries.
This activity is driven by a series of political and economic incentives that are
common to all provinces in central China. A township Party secretary from
Suxian county in Henan admitted to spending two-thirds of the year “chasing
the cash” in eight different provinces.12 Through meetings and the content of
the townships’ annual assessments, county leaders make it clear to township lea-
ders that attracting investment is the surest way for them to earn promotion to a
good county bureau and reap personal financial rewards. Attracting industrial
investment also offers future revenue sources, which is why township govern-
ments tend to waive conveyancing fees.13 Because of the possibility for enrich-
ment and travel, powerful agencies, such as the police, rural credit
co-operatives and the finance bureau, tend to be over-represented in working
groups for attracting investment. But quick-witted and well-connected staff are
also poached from township agencies, meaning that staff left behind in the
township tend to be the least talented.
Table 1: Priorities of Township Governments (%)
Task 2006 1999 1980s
a) Tasks assigned by higher levels of government 51 75 75
b) National Party guiding principles and policies 76 58 63
c) Farmers’ economic and political rights 46 9 3
d) Agricultural technology extension, information and public services 54 23 24
e) Developing culture, education and health 32 19 33
f) Public works and infrastructure, e.g. rural roads and irrigation 50 35 32
g) Attracting investment 74 19 5
h) Ensuring public stability 38 39 53
i) Family planning 86 99 71
j) Collecting tax 0 95 92
Source:
Author’s survey, 2006, N = 95.
11 This is common elsewhere in Anhui. My attempt to survey township staff in Wuhu county came to an
abrupt end when it emerged that less than 10% of staff could be located. Their colleagues had all left the
county to seek investors.
12 Liang Peng, Jiceng ganbu zhaoshang yinzi: nongmin xin liang (Making the Farmers’ Blood Run Cold:
Local Cadres Attracting Investment), China Elections and Governance website, 13 December 2005,
http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=43318, accessed 2 July 2009.
13 Such is not the case with commercial and residential property developments. See Tao Ran, Su Fubing,
Liu Mingxing and Cao Guangzhong, “Leasing and local public finance in China’s regional develop-
ment: evidence from prefecture-level cities,” Urban Studies, forthcoming.
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The emphasis on attracting investment has increased this tendency for
squandering limited township funds on food and drink.14 County documents
contain detailed instructions on what sort of food should be served at banquets,
strict expenditure limits (no more than 90 yuan per table for village cadres, less
than 120 yuan for county leaders) and a ban on drinking at lunchtime.15 These
restrictions, however, are all waived if attracting investment is the purpose of
the meal. I was widely viewed as a potential “investor” and hence was a sought-
after lunch guest.
Inspections
Gu Wenfeng describes the everyday frustrations arising from the township gov-
ernment’s lack of agency in its dealings with county and prefectural leaders:
The county has cadres who are industrious; others less so. Some cadres have no idea how to fill
up their day. They’ll read the smallest advertisements in the paper several times over. A news-
paper and a cup of tea, that’s a day’s labour. But when they get fed up, it’s time for an inspec-
tion of “grassroots work.” They’ll happily go for a tour, or perhaps score some points [on the
annual assessment] by calling a meeting. They loaf around, eating and drinking for a few days,
picking up “souvenirs.” When the higher-level organs carry out their work, do they ever con-
sider whether it has the slightest economic or social benefit?
As far as township cadres are concerned, I tell them to focus on results, don’t worry about
process. If there are petitions [by farmers to higher levels], no matter the reason, blame lies
with the township. If the higher levels make work arrangements, it doesn’t matter if they are
relevant; tasks have to be completed otherwise criticism is swift. Regardless of funding, when
you’re required to accomplish something it must be done. As far as higher levels are concerned,
convene a meeting, write a memorandum, issue a document and then carry out inspections.
That’s it. But down in the township, no matter what the circumstances, no matter what difficul-
ties you face, the task has to be completed – no one is going to do it for you, or take
responsibility.16
As Gu notes, the large number of staff at the county level increases the frequency
of inspections, forcing township leaders to take staff away from their real jobs, a
situation frequently described by interviewees as “not attending to one’s proper
duties” (bu wu zheng ye不务正业). From a macro-perspective, the township gov-
ernment is effectively hollowed from within as staff and township leaders are
forced to leave their posts to attend to the priority of the day. Inspections by
higher levels served to remind township staff that their main duty is carrying
out “key work.” The head of one township agency observed:
The township leadership’s work is basically about coping with all the inspections by the higher-
ups, there’s no thought of taking the lead in developing the region. Grassroots cadres need to be
liberated from endless inspections and placed under the direct management of the county level.
Then we won’t all be dragged into work stemming from the “one-strike rejection.”17
14 See also Gu Wenfeng, Extraordinary Accounts, pp. 146–49; Wu Yi, Uproar in a Small Town, pp. 577–81.
15 X Town Cadre Management System (Jiguan ganbu guanli zhidu), 2008.
16 Gu Wenfeng, Extraordinary Accounts, pp. 101–02.
17 The “one-strike rejection” (yi piao foujue) is applied to government tasks that have the highest priority,
most consistently family planning and preventing social unrest. Failure to complete such tasks means
that (at least in theory) all other achievements by the township government are annulled. See also
Maria Edin, “State capacity and local agent control in China: CCP cadre management from a township
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At the beginning of each year, all staff are divided up into work groups, often
attending to tasks unrelated to their actual skills. One township had over 30
such groups in 2008, with the Party secretary acting as the chair on 14 of them.
To satisfy the requirements of higher-level inspection teams, phantom agencies
are created by township leaders. These “hanging sign work units” (gua paizi dan-
wei 挂牌子单位) have no personnel assigned to them on a full-time basis. When
there is an inspection, the agencies for the “new socialist countryside,” industry
and trade, and ecology all bustle with activity. Reports will be furnished to
demonstrate achievements and if necessary, an inspection tour to a carefully
selected site will be arranged. As soon as the inspection team leaves, these
agencies revert to what they really are: freshly painted black and white signs.
Such subterfuge is common at all levels of government. Wu Yi quotes the head
of a township family planning office18:
All higher-level inspections of family planning work are random; you don’t know which village
or which hamlet they’ll visit, so there’s a degree of surprise. But within the space of four to five
days, we’re able to coach every target household in every hamlet at least once, letting them
know the contents and tricks of the inspection, so really there’s no surprise.
He estimates that villages experience at least six family planning inspections
annually (two from each of the prefecture, county and township), in addition
to continuous surveillance by village cadres and the designated “family planning
worker” in each hamlet.19 Thus, all target households are versed in coping with
inspections.
Constant inspections were also a drain on township finances. In Benghai
county, “entertainment expenses” ranked as the largest item of township govern-
ment expenditure after salaries. Some townships have been more successful than
others in reducing the burden of such expenses. One township close to the county
seat had accumulated a debt of seven million yuan, and all interviewees cited
“hosting guests” ( jiedai 接待) as the main contributing factor. A large amount
spent on entertainment, however, does not in itself indicate profligacy on the
part of township leaders. As one county official explained, “it just means that
the higher-ups like to dine there” (shangmian ai chi 上面爱吃). Wealthier town-
ships see more inspection teams and thus run up larger debts. As a township lea-
der explained to Zhao Shukai, remote townships “are rarely inspected by various
higher-level departments and so have less to spend on entertainment.”20 He
found that township leaders spent an average of 100 to 150 days per year on
reception activities (one spent 300 days), and the expenses incurred from
footnote continued
perspective,” The China Quarterly, No. 173 (2003), pp. 35–52; Zhao Shukai, “Rural governance,”
pp. 64–73; and Graeme Smith, “Political machinations in a rural county” The China Journal, No. 62
(2009), pp. 50–53.
18 Wu Yi, Uproar in a Small Town, p. 585.
19 Ibid. p. 590. See also Zhao Shukai, “Rural governance,” pp. 23–25.
20 Zhao Shukai, “Rural governance,” p. 39.
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“karaoke singing, sauna sessions and mahjong” accounted for between 5 and 10
per cent of fiscal income.21
Many township staff expressed the view that the main problem faced by town-
ship governments wasn’t that they were overstaffed, but rather the capricious be-
haviour of leading cadres and the institutional dynamics of township
government.22 In particular, theywere exasperated that politicalmachinations con-
tinued to trump government functions. As one noted: “Weneed to come out of this
miasma of complex documents and targets set by higher levels, give up playing
games on paper (wenzi youxi文字游戏), and actually start providing services for
ordinary people.” A proliferation of documents meant that the township leaders
were often bemused over how to govern. If an issue was receiving national atten-
tion, different higher-level bureaus would issue different documents, leading to
“document wars” (wenzhang douzheng文章斗争). The bureaus of forestry, agricul-
ture and environmental protection were constantly at odds. In large part, the work
of deputy township leaders was travelling to the county seat to settle these conflicts.
Township staff were quizzed as to whether they had any confidence in the
direction township reform was taking, and what sort of reform of township gov-
ernment they felt was the best course. The results shown in Table 2 indicate a low
level (18 per cent) of confidence in the current reform process.
The most widely accepted strategy for reform was to make the township an
agency of the county government. In the view of many respondents, this reflected
the existing balance of power between the townships and the county,23 and was
the most effective way to cut out the middlemen – township Party leaders. As one
noted: “Most professional work carried out by township agencies is directed by
county departments. If the township government itself simply becomes a county
agency, everyone can go about their work more effectively, and unnecessary fric-
tion between the township and county will be alleviated.” Another argued: “With
improvements in transportation and communications, this [model] suits current
economic conditions, and reduces the capacity of township leaders to abuse
their power and connive for personal gain.” Zhao Shukai found that although
this would amount to removal of their own authority, this was the opinion of
half of the 20 township Party secretaries he interviewed. One Party secretary
from Hunan explained: “The township governments just cannot cope with all
the inspections from above. [They] are like firefighters with no definite duties
… all cadres are required to work together on all matters. Dismantling township
governments will have no great effect on ordinary people. The biggest problem is
where to put the township cadres.”24
21 Ibid. pp. 21–25.
22 This echoes Linda Chelan Li, “Embedded institutionalization: sustaining rural tax reform in China,”
The Pacific Review, Vol. 19, No. 1 (2006), pp. 63–84. Li’s arguments on the primary need for behaviour-
al change among officials hold true for township governments in Benghai. At the county level, however,
overstaffing is rampant, and is a major reason for cadre non-performance.
23 Kennedy, “From the tax-for-fee reform to the abolition of agricultural taxes,” p. 45.
24 Zhao Shukai, “Rural governance,” pp. 31–32.
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Soft centralization: differentiated experiences within township governments
Andrew Mertha described the shifting of township or county agencies to provincial
control as “soft centralization.” A parallel trend has seen agencies previously con-
trolled by township governments placed under the control of the county. The crucial
distinction is whether the corresponding bureau at the county level has “leadership
relations” (lingdao guanxi 领导关系) with the township bureau, or whether it only
has “professional relations” (yewu guanxi业务关系). Those which are under leader-
ship relations and are thus controlled by their line bureau at the county level or
above are referred to as “vertical agencies” (chuizhi danwei 垂直单位). Those with
only professional relations to their line bureau are effectively controlled by township
leaders, and are called “devolved work units” (xiafang danwei 下放单位).
Mertha observed that the first bureaus to undergo “soft centralization” to the
provincial level were those associated with “administrative regulation, financial
regulation and commodities management … because of their vital role in
China’s economic development.”25 From the perspective of township leaders,
the equation is simpler. Bureaus with “money and power” (you qian you quan
有钱有权) are claimed by higher levels of government, while those with neither
money nor power, derogatively known as “clear water agencies” (qing shui
yamen 清水衙门), are left under the control of township leaders.
To see whether the management status of an agency influenced its rank in the
eyes of ordinary township government staff, respondents were presented with an
open-response question (each township has different agencies, so a list would
have been incomplete) as to which six township agencies enjoyed the best work-
ing conditions and salaries (daiyu zui hao 待遇最好). Table 3 shows the top ten
township agencies in Benghai county, where only the lowest-ranked agency,
the agricultural extension station, is under full township government control.
Table 2: Attitudes towards Township Government Structural Reform (%)




Best course for reform
No need for change 31
County-level agency 39
Abolish township government 5
Take away some functions from the township 15
Other 9
Source:
Author’s survey, 2006. N = 95.
25 Mertha, “China’s ‘soft’ centralization,” pp. 793–94.
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Apart from vertical control, the most consistent thread between township
agencies with superior working conditions is the ability to levy and – to differing
extents – retain fees and fines to cover salaries, general office expenses and “enter-
tainment.”While vertical agencies are physically located in a township, the town-
ship Party and government organs in theory have no formal authority to control
the leaders or even the staff of these agencies.
However, the independence of vertical agencies is not absolute. Their staff live
and work in the township, and are subject to informal pressures. As an example,
the rural credit co-operatives answer to the province, but township leaders, par-
ticularly the township Party secretary, exercise discretion over who can receive
substantial loans. Similarly, if the township government opts to divert funds ear-
marked for flood relief, the finance and civil affairs agencies can be pressed to
comply with little danger. The head of a township land management agency,
which on paper answers to the county, explained the pressure to ignore the
malfeasance of township leaders: “I have two wives. I should obey my first
wife, but relatively speaking she’s far away. My second wife is right here and
nags me endlessly, so she usually gets what she wants.” The heads of compliant
agencies benefit financially, and the working conditions of these agencies will
improve. The lack of funding for township governments has meant that embez-
zling earmarked project funds has gained acceptance among township govern-
ment leaders and staff as a morally legitimate way to maintain working
conditions.26 The practice is known as “knocking down the east wall to prop
up the west wall” (chai dong qiang bu xi qiang 拆东墙补西墙).
While wealthy vertical agencies often attempted to separate themselves phys-
ically from the township government, creating “separatist regimes,”27 devolved
agencies were unable to resist the opposite pressure from township leaders. The
lack of physical boundaries between devolved agencies in many townships was
striking. In one township, five different agencies shared one small room with
only three desks: the agricultural extension station, the agricultural economic
management station, the social insurance organization, the poverty alleviation
office, and the broadcasting and culture station. Such an arrangement encour-
aged a collective approach to township government work. Whether collecting
tax arrears, preparing for a family planning inspection or promoting the “new
socialist countryside,” township leaders preferred “all hands on deck.” In the
devolved agencies, professional boundaries were rarely respected.
Some staff in devolved agencies felt that the township leaders themselves were
in an untenable position, that the proliferation of documents, meetings, inspec-
tions and other tasks received from higher levels made it difficult for the township
26 See Gu Wenfeng, Extraordinary Accounts, pp. 151–53; and Ray Yep, “Can ‘tax-for-fee’ reform reduce
rural tension in China? The process, progress and limitations,” The China Quarterly, No. 177 (2004), pp.
44–45.
27 See Mertha, “China’s ‘soft’ centralization,” pp. 804–05.
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government to provide meaningful services to farmers. As one agricultural exten-
sion station head explained:
The township government is overrun with countless difficult issues (qian tou wan xu千头万绪),
simply far too many to complete, so the township leaders usually have no time for agricultural
extension work. That’s not to say that they never will. Take last year as an example. The county
pressured them to promote tea and bamboo processing, and suddenly I had their attention. But
if there is the slightest let up in pressure from above, the township leaders disappear. It becomes
a choice: they can pay it attention, or not. For the moment, the county is attentive, asking “How
many demonstrations have you carried out? How much mountainous land has been reclaimed?
What acreage of new tea plantations has been established?” County officials come to inspect,
make reports, issue documents.28 So the township leaders pay attention. But otherwise nothing
will happen, and there’s no way they’d ever think about looking for new responsibilities.
Without extreme pressure from above, they’re numb and indifferent (wu qi wu li 无气无力).
This picture of township government officials bewildered by the number of higher
level inspections and assessments matches that outlined by a State Council
research team.29
Many interviewees felt that they had effectively become an extension of the
township Party branch, responding to the priorities of township Party leaders,
which tended to change according to the political wind of the day. Interviewees
explained that the effect of this chaotic work schedule was “numbness” (mamu
麻木). Unable to work according to Weberian “calculable rules and ‘without
regard for persons’,”30 many township staff in devolved agencies, while nominally
under the full control of the township leaders, paradoxically become harder to
mobilize than staff in vertical agencies. With little prospect of promotion or recog-
nition, and limited agency over their daily work, they shirk their duties.31
Table 3: Township Agencies with the Best Working Conditions
Agencies Mentioned by (%) Management
Finance caizheng suo 财政所 100 County
Party and government dangzheng ban 党政办 71 N/A
Family planning jisheng ban 计生办 65 County/township
Local tax dishui ban地税办 29 Province
Police paichu suo派出所 26 County
Land tuguan suo土管所 26 County
Industry and commerce gongshang ju 工商局 23 Province
Education jiaoyu ban 教育办 21 County/township
Civil affairs minzheng ban 民政办 16 County/township
Agricultural extension nongji zhan 农技站 11 Township
Source:
Author’s survey, 2006, N = 95; author’s Interviews, 2004–08.
28 Several sources in the county government estimated that the average township would receive at least
1,000 documents per year from higher levels.
29 Duan Yingbi and Hongyuan Song (eds.), Zhongguo nongcun gaige zhongda zhengce wenti yanjiu baogao
(A Research Report on the Major Policy Problems of Reform in Rural China) (Beijing: Zhongguo
caizheng jingji chubanshe, 2004), p. 57.
30 Max Weber, Economy and Society, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 975.
31 Zhao Shukai, “Rural governance,” pp. 70–73.
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Not all personnel within devolved agencies were keen to return to higher-level
control, however, as past experience had taught them that weak county-level
agencies were unable to provide financial security.32 The township agricultural
economy station is rumoured to be returning to line management later in 2009,
and many staff were uneasy about this development. As one explained:
We don’t want to return to being a vertical agency (gui tiao归条), because we don’t want to be
run by the county agricultural committee. Our wages and subsidies [for meals and transport] are
guaranteed by the finance bureau, but if we go back to line management, there’s no way the
higher-ups will pay for our subsidies. Nor will the township government pay, because you’re
no longer managed by them.
While township staff tended to refer to “township leaders” as a whole, this group
was sharply divided in terms of which interests it served. Township Party sec-
retaries and township heads, selected by the county standing committee, were
as a rule chosen as “a pair” and would generally work together to further their
political interests. Rather than residing in their township, as was the norm during
the 1980s and 1990s, township Party secretaries usually live in the county seat
and commute to the township when required. However, older deputy township
leaders who saw little prospect of promotion to the county level owe less
fealty to the county leadership, and often lobbied against projects initiated
at the county level or above, or acted to protect their own network of local
business interests.
With township leaders frustrated, focused on their future careers, and spending
large amounts of the year outside the township attending meetings or entertaining
potential investors, a power vacuum has emerged in many townships. The office
managers (bangongshi zhuren办公室主任) who head the township administrative
offices control access to the Party secretary, and thus wield disproportionate
influence. They co-ordinate township government staff during the long periods
when township leaders are away. While most township government agencies
(apart from family planning, finance and the police) are usually deserted, one
office manager has eight staff working under him, including a driver. Like
their counterparts at the county level, their authority derives from the ill-defined
limits of their powers. Many new township Party secretaries appoint their own
office manager, usually a trusted personal friend whom they previously relied
upon while working in the county government.
Faced with resistance from staff in vertical agencies which no longer answer to
them, frustrated by unmotivated staff in devolved agencies, and pressured from
above by county leaders and an endless stream of inspections, township leaders
also often felt they weren’t able to do real work. “Soft centralization” may
have succeeded in shifting the locus of power upwards to the county and provin-
cial levels, but the goal of building a more modern and compliant bureaucracy at
the township level seems elusive. While the abolition of agricultural taxes in 2006
32 Mertha, “China’s ‘soft’ centralization,” pp. 806–08.
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means that the township government has lost much of its traditional extractive
function, centralization has weakened the cohesiveness of the township
bureaucracy.
Hollowed from Below: Sent-Down Cadres and Family Planning
Sent-down cadres
In addition to a core staff of three to five native village cadres (Party secretary/
village head, deputy Party secretary/village head, village clerk, women’s cadre),
villages usually contain several cadres from the county and township govern-
ments. Allocating staff to villages is usually the first item of business for a new
township government, and lobbying of township leaders by staff to be sent to
a “good” village is intense. This practice of cadres from higher levels being
responsible for a given village was a crucial aspect of the county government’s
efforts to control and monitor village governments,33 and had the effect of draw-
ing a large number of staff out of the township government. For younger town-
ship cadres, working as a sent-down cadre enhances their prospects of promotion.
However, being assigned to a village with many “problem households” (dingzi hu
钉子户) can severely harm their political prospects, as they face a system of finan-
cial and political punishment for any disturbances in their allocated village. This
has led to infighting among township cadres during the period leading up to a
change in township leaders.
One administrative village that I visited had six sent-down cadres (one from the
county industrial and commercial bureau, five from the township), outnumbering
the five regular village cadres, and most villages have at least three township
cadres. Commonly, managing a village is either accepted as a “task” (renwu 任
务) or resented as a waste of both the villagers’ time and their own. As one former
township cadre explained:
Back in 2005, I was about to be sent down to a village, but I got out just in time [to a post in the
county government]. I’d worked in the township government for more than ten years, so there
was no way I wanted to be sent down, I’d still be stuck working there now. It would have been
almost impossible to escape at my age. They call it “training” (duanlian 锻炼), but township
government work is in the villages, dealing with the peasants. After such a long time, you
know the villages inside out, there are no mysteries. What training? It’s meaningless.
Many county government officials admitted that the practice was not just an
effort to reassert control over village governments, but also a direct result of
pressure to streamline township governments.
33 Another development with a similar impact was the combining of the posts of village Party secretary
and (formerly elected) village head, referred to as “taking the load on one shoulder” (yi jian tiao).
This had been implemented in 60% of Benghai’s administrative villages, meaning that nearly two-thirds
of village leaders were effectively appointed by township governments. This is in keeping with develop-
ments elsewhere in China, and has had the unintended consequence of increasing intra-village tensions
between clans. See Gu Wenfeng, Extraordinary Accounts, pp. 176–78.
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There are regional variations. One village head from Liaoning province told
me that in his area they would not tolerate sent-down cadres because villagers
saw them as an infringement of the village’s sphere of self-governance.34 At
the other end of the spectrum, another researcher in northern Anhui found
that practically all township cadres, with the exception of the township Party
secretary and the township head, were working as sent-down cadres.35
Provincial sources suggest that from 2000, as streamlining reforms were under-
taken in earnest, the number of sent-down cadres increased.36 The county govern-
ment had also amassed cadres from the central, provincial and prefectural
governments.37
Zhao Shukai suggests that sent-down cadres are required in two types of vil-
lages: those that have been selected as showcase model villages for inspections
by higher levels of government (the “new socialist countryside” programme has
proved a boon to these already privileged villages), and those where there have
been disturbances or signs of an emerging crisis.38 However, in Benghai the prac-
tice is routine for all administrative villages, and the number of sent-down cadres
in a village increases with proximity to the county seat. Asked whether there were
many meetings attended by village leaders in the township, one cadre declared:
“There’s no need. Every village has several township cadres staying in it. If the
upper levels have any fresh instructions, we just inform those cadres.” The num-
ber of cadres sent down from the townships was so numerous that they were
divided into three different categories, according to rank: senior cadres, ordinary
cadres and family planning liaison personnel.
In addition to sending out a substantial proportion of their staff, township lea-
ders routinely interfere in village elections, often playing “moral politics.”39 Few
village cadres were sacked without a well-publicized reason. One village Party
secretary was axed for his perceived corruption in managing a village-run coal-
brick factory during the 1990s, while a village head was removed after being
involved in protracted divorce proceedings. Villagers concurred that if he could
not run his own family, he was unfit to manage the village. Replacements for
“failed” village leaders invariably had a strong backer in the township govern-
ment, usually a well-placed relative.
The salaries of village cadres in Benghai are now paid entirely from the town-
ship government budget, rather than drawing income from village enterprises or
from a percentage of collected taxes. In Benghai county, village governments are
now effectively outposts of township governments, and largely respond to the
34 Author’s interview, Beijing, April 2006.
35 See Man, Sent-Down Cadres and Village Self Governance.
36 Author’s interviews, Anhui Academy of Social Sciences, November 2008.
37 Smith, “Political machinations,” pp. 35–38.
38 Zhao Shukai, “Xiang cun guanxi: zai kongzhi zhong tuojie” (“Township–village relations: dislocated
control”), Huazhong shifan daxue xuebao (Journal of Huazhong University), Vol. 44, No. 5 (2005), p. 4.
39 Hok Bun Ku, Moral Politics in a South China Village: Responsibility, Reciprocity, and Resistance
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).
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priorities of their superiors in the township.40 He who pays the piper calls the
tune, and in Benghai county the tune in the villages is family planning.
Family planning
As well as the amount of tax collected (which ceased to be an important criterion
in 2006), one aspect of government work has remained paramount for assessing
the performance of townships since the 1980s: family planning. Indicators for
success in implementing family planning policies have grown more complex
over time, which partly explains why this now occupies township and village gov-
ernments’ time and resources. A county notice states how many points each task
will be worth in the sent-down cadres’ annual assessments (Table 4).
The “one-strike rejection policy” is attached to family planning targets in
the township government’s annual assessment and in the individual assessments
of sent-down cadres, and reinforced by regular inspections by higher levels of
government. One direct consequence is that township agencies are hollowed
out from within by pressure to divert resources to family planning. To illustrate
this, I provide information on the staffing situation within the agricultural exten-
sion stations of Benghai’s 16 townships. These surveys revealed that a majority of
township agricultural extension agents spent most of their time on tasks unrelated
to extension work. Indeed, many went through 2005 without doing a single day
of extension work. The main agency they worked for was the family planning
office. The breakdown of Benghai’s township extension agents in terms of their
actual workplaces is shown in Table 5.
Table 5 indicates that in 2005 only 26 per cent of Benghai’s agricultural exten-
sion workers actually worked as extension agents, with an equal number working
for the family planning office. Given that sent-down village cadres have been
shown to spend most of their time on family planning work, at least 37 per
cent of extension agents were devoting all or most of their time to implementing
family planning policy. An equal number had been transferred to the townships’
family planning agencies, with the remainder working in the villages or in other
township agencies which were deemed to be current priorities. This phenomenon
of “not doing one’s real job” (wu bu zheng ye务不正业) was common to all town-
ship government agencies.
The figure of 26 per cent working as extension agents is almost certainly an
overestimate. Many held “concurrent posts” ( jianzhi 兼职) making it difficult
to determine whether their main work was agricultural extension or the duties
associated with their “concurrent post.” Where possible, these extension agents
were asked what the bulk of their work entailed, but where it was not possible
40 There are caveats to this. If a village is home to an influential cadre from a higher level of government,
the township can, to an extent, be bypassed by the village government, particularly in attracting
investment.
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to interview them it was assumed that their main task was agricultural extension.
Even staff who were officially “full-time” (zhuanzhi 专职) extension agents often
admitted that they did little or no extension work. The head of one extension
station, who was annually awarded the title of “excellent” (youxiu 优秀) by
the county agricultural committee, admitted that since 2001 (when township
extension stations were devolved) he was lucky to spend more than 30 days
each year doing his job.
Village cadres made little pretence that their work involved much beyond
family planning. Male cadres often joked that the women’s cadre (in charge of
Table 5: Actual Work Units of Township Agricultural Workers
Agency/station %
Agricultural extension nongji zhan农技站 26
Family planning jisheng ban 计生办 26
Sent-down village cadres xiapai cunji ganbu下派干部 11
Social insurance shehui baoxian zu社会保险组 9
Township government ofﬁce xiangzhen zhengfu bangongshi乡镇政府办公室 7
Party and government dang zheng ban党政办 3
Agricultural supply business nongzi chuangshou农资创收 2
Industrial estate management
committee
gongyuan qu guanli weiyuanhui公园区管理委员会 2
Industry and commerce gongmao ban 工贸办 2
Urban planning chengzhen guihua ban 城镇规划办 1
Urbanization and civilization chengjian wenming ban 城建文明办 1
Residential area shequ 社区 1
Projects and investment zhaoshang ban 招商办 1
Ecology shengtai ban生态办 1
Source:
Author’s survey, 2006, N = 135.
Table 4: Assessment Criteria for Sent-down Village Cadres
Assessment criteria Points
Family planning 30
Ecological support (agriculture, forestry, irrigation, technical training, establishing
agribusinesses)
15
Public stability (law and order, petitions, safe work practices) 10
Establishing grassroots organizations 5
Establishing basic infrastructure 5
Finance and agricultural economic work 5
Creating civilization (propaganda work, public health, markets) 4
Cadre work style 4
Developing the collective and private economy 4
Poverty alleviation 4
Notes:
Notice on the methods for implementing point-scoring assessments of sent down village cadres, Town Y, 2006.
Items scoring three points or less: transitional work, militia training, attracting investment, land management, civil administration,
education, record keeping and social security.
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family planning) was the only one with a real job, and that the other village
cadres were just her assistants. In one internal note listing the allocation of
tasks among the newly elected cadres of a relatively wealthy village, family plan-
ning was mentioned eight times, far more frequently than other priorities, such as
“compiling personnel files” (twice), “public stability” (once) and “creating spiri-
tual civilization” (once). The emphasis on family planning was confirmed in this
village’s budget. The main listed expenditure items for 2005 were two trips to
track down pregnant women who had fled the county. The only listed item of
income was 25,000 yuan from the township government,41 but the real figures
for entertainment expenses are never listed, nor are salaries. By 2008, like
many villages in Benghai, the village had been forced to hire an additional
staff member to work on family planning.
Conclusions
What does the view from the inside tell us about the nature of the local
state in rural townships? Most of the actors are making the best of what is
often quite a poor hand. Township Party secretaries and younger sent-down
village Party secretaries from the county are typically hard-working, doing
their best to extract visible results that will impress their superiors in the
county government, which they hope will lead to promotion to a better remuner-
ated and less taxing post. As leading cadres see their future in the county,
the county government enjoys considerable control over the priorities of town-
ship governments.
With higher levels of government placing pressure on them to cut costs and
streamline staff, and an increasing number of bureaus placed outside their formal
control as vertical agencies, township Party leaders have responded by tightening
their control over devolved agencies and villages, sending out their surplus cadres
to ensure that village cadres enforce the key tasks of family planning and social
stability, and ensuring that “their” candidates control the activities of village gov-
ernments. Concurrently, the most able township cadres are leaving their posts to
spend ever-increasing amounts of time outside the province in the hope of secur-
ing industrial investment, satisfying both the political imperatives of the annual
assessments system, and the revenue imperatives of county and township govern-
ments. While during the 1980s and 1990s the township Party secretary could
readily be found in the township government compound, the day-to-day running
of hollowed-out township governments is now left to office managers and the
least-talented staff.
41 There are still many ways by which village cadres can squeeze extra revenue from their constituents to
cover their entertainment expenses. With the increased social security coverage, village cadres can use
their discretionary control to extract revenue from the poorest rural residents. If villagers refuse to
“give back” a percentage of the minimum living allowance (set at 860 yuan per year in 2008), cadres
will direct the funds elsewhere.
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Such hollowed-out organizations are unable to play an active role in rural com-
munities, and there are ingredients in the current structure of rural governance
that are anathema to service provision, and will undermine attempts to transform
township governments into “service-oriented” agencies. Without a move away
from the practice of administrative coercion, and the “one-strike rejection” that
gives rise to it, the local state will continue to view farmers as problems, rather
than as clients or citizens.
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